PhD defence A.G. (Alina) Andrei

Below is a brief summary of the dissertation:

The most important problem in corporate governance is the one arising from the separation of ownership and control, commonly known as the Agency Problem. Much of the related research in Management focuses on corporate governance mechanisms – (mainly) internal and external – that can help mitigate this problem and ensure suppliers of finance receive an appropriate return on their investment. This thesis takes a behavioral perspective to investigate the effectiveness of certain external corporate governance mechanisms. Specifically, this research investigates the evolving dynamics of shareholder voting, financial analysts’ pressure, and institutional investor engagement, as external corporate governance mechanisms. It comprises three studies focusing on: the influence of a shareholder vote of no confidence in management on firm governance decisions, the psychological dimensions of CEO responses to perceived pressure from positive analyst recommendations, and the mechanisms that lead from expressions of commitment to active ownership to actual demonstrations of ownership commitment from institutional investors.