Crime and Punishment: Do Politicians in Power Receive Special Treatment in Courts? Evidence from India

If this is the case, it facilitates corruption by allowing politicians to operate under impunity, attracts dishonest individuals and criminals to get into politics, affects investment and growth, erodes citizens’ trust in institutions, increases social inequalities, among others.

Are elected politicians treated more leniently when facing criminal charges? If so, how do they do it and how can we prevent this from happening? This paper provides causal evidence of the impact of winning office on legal outcomes for the largest democracy in the world, India. I study whether ongoing criminal cases of candidates running for the state legislature get more favorable legal outcomes when the accused politicians are elected.

The results provide evidence of judicial discretion in favor of elected politicians of the state ruling party. Winners of the ruling party are more likely to get their pending criminal cases closed without a conviction during their period in the legislature.  One of the main reasons for this favorable treatment seems to be that powers vested in the executive are misused to manipulate law-and-order officials’ behavior (via appointments, promotions, and transfers). Additional evidence also highlights that witnesses from the prosecution turn hostile in cases against powerful politicians. This suggests that (1) providing higher independence to institutions depending on the government such as the prosecution department and the police, and (2) implementing witness protection programs might better insulate the criminal justice system from political pressures. This should reduce the abuse of power and prevent the imposition of economic institutions benefiting the elites at the expense of the rest of the society.