- Speaker
- Date
- Thursday 3 Feb 2022, 12:00 - 13:00
- Type
- Seminar
- Location
Online seminar
- Ticket information
To participate, please send an email to: ae-secr@ese.eur.nl
This paper exploits exogenous variation in tax notches created by controlled foreign corporation (CFC) rules to better understand the profit-shifting behavior of multinationals.
Using new data on CFC rules and bilateral parent-affiliate ownership data, we estimate a profit-shifting semi-elasticity of about 0.32. Furthermore, we provide evidence that the unilateral implementation of anti-tax-avoidance regulation at the parent location leads to profit relocations consistent with tax-minimizing behavior. We do not find any evidence that parent countries benefit from this regulation (in terms of repatriated tax base) or that parent firms bear the economic costs (real outcomes of parents remain unaffected).
- Related links
- Department of Economics