Françoise Forges will present her paper called 'Games with incomplete information: from repetition to cheap talk and persuasion'
- Date
- Friday 14 Feb 2020, 12:00 - 13:00
- Type
- Seminar
- Room
- C1-2
- Building
- Theil Building
Abstract:
This essay aims at showing that repeated games with incomplete information, which were conceived by Aumann and Maschler in the years 1960s, provide basic tools to study information transmission in static interactive decision problems, both when the agents monitoring information can lie (“cheap talk”) and when they cannot (“persuasion”).
Please find the paper attached:
- More information
If you would like a bilateral, join for lunch or dinner on Friday evening, please send an email to boring@ese.eur.nl
- Related links
- Department of Economics
