PhD defence D. (Daniëlle) Cattel

Despite substantial contributions of healthcare systems to life expectancy and quality of life, in many countries it is widely recognized that there remains considerable room for improvements in the efficiency, quality, and outcomes of health care. In the context of ever-increasing healthcare expenditures, realizing more ‘value’ in health care has therefore increasingly become a focal point in health policy. An essential element in the transition towards more value is restructuring the financial incentives embedded in consumer and provider payment systems. What alternative systems should look like and what this would entail in practice, however, remains poorly understood. Therefore, the main aim of this dissertation is to provide insights into key issues in the design of alternative, value-based payment incentives for consumers and providers, and in associated tradeoffs and incentive effects. In doing so, this research contributes to the body of knowledge concerning smarter choices in payment system design. Based on multiple literature and simulation studies, Daniëlle Cattel concludes that design choices matter, and that each choice has specific advantages and disadvantages. It is up to decision makers to make the unescapable incentive tradeoffs.

The public defence will take place at the Senate Hall, 1st floor Erasmus Building, location campus Woudestein. The ceremony will begin exactly at 13.00 PM. In light of the solemn nature of the ceremony, we recommend that you do not take children under the age of 6 to the first part of the ceremony.