We welcome Professor Lukas Meyer, Head of the section Moral and Political Philosophy at the University of Graz, for this Faculty Colloquium. Lukas Meyer will give a research talk about Legitimate Expectations and Compensation in Changing Circumstances and the relevance of his philosophy for climate justice. The talk will be accessible to a broad audience, including students. You can find the abstract for his talk below.
- Date
- Thursday 30 Jan 2025, 14:30 - 16:45
- Type
- Lecture
- Spoken Language
- English
- Room
- Room T3-10
- Building
- Mandeville Building
Schedule
14.30-14.50: Introduction to Climate Justice and the relevance of Lukas Meyer’s philosophy with Laura García-Portela.
Break
15.00-15.30: Legitimate Expectations and Compensation in Changing circumstances
15.30-15.45: Comments by Constanze Binder
Break
16:00-16:45: General Q&A
Drinks at the Paviljoen.
Legitimate Expectations and Compensation in Changing Circumstances
Professor Meyer will talk about his paper Legitimate Expectations and Compensation in Changing Circumstances. This paper discusses how legitimate expectations should be treated during transitional processes. It examines whether the state may frustrate those expectations which, although legitimate at time T1, are no longer legitimate at time T2 due to changed circumstances. It also discusses the conditions under which those whose expectations may be frustrated during transitional processes should receive compensation. First, we argue that legitimate expectations reflect a legitimate interest in receiving the benefits of the basic structure of society. We then distinguish between legitimate expectations that are protected by rights and those that are not. We argue that while the former type of legitimate expectation may be justifiably frustrated when doing so is necessary to achieve a more just society, the range of cases in which it is permissible to frustrate the latter type of expectation is broader. Finally, we argue that when someone is committed to a particular life plan based on an expectation that was legitimate at T1 but is no longer legitimate at T2 because of changed circumstances, the value of personal autonomy gives rise to a "meta-expectation" that people will be given some time to adjust their life plans to new circumstances. We also argue that the frustration of expectations that are no longer legitimate during transitions may still require compensation after the change in circumstances, if the agent responsible for creating the expectation frustrates it and the expectation holder has done nothing wrong in relying on it.
- More information
Professor Doctor Lukas Meyer has been Professor of Philosophy and Head of the Section Moral and Political Philosophy at the Institute of Philosophy at the University of Graz since March 2009.
He studied philosophy, political science, history and public international law at the University of Tübingen, the Free University of Berlin, Washington University in St. Louis, Yale Law School and the University of Oxford. He was a Fellow at the Ethics Center at Harvard University and a Feodor-Lynen Research Fellow at Columbia University in NYC.
His fields of work are philosophy, ethics, political philosophy, philosophy of law and social philosophy. His research focuses on justice in time and space. Ongoing research projects on intergenerational justice, ethics of climate change and historical justice. As one of the first philosophers, he was one of the main authors of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC).
