On Friday 5 October 2018 Rutger Kerkkamp will defend his PhD thesis entitled 'Optimisation Models for Supply Chain Coordination under Information Asymmetry'. Supervisors are Professor Albert Wagelmans and Associate Professor of Operations Research Wilco van den Heuvel.
About Rutger Kerkkamp
Rutger Kerkkamp holds an MSc degree in Econometrics and Management Science from Erasmus University Rotterdam and an MSc degree in Applied Mathematics from Delft University of Technology, both with a specialisation in optimisation, operations research, and logistics. His research interests range from theoretical proofs in optimisation to applied logistical problems, and include the design and implementation of algorithms.
As a PhD candidate at Erasmus University Rotterdam, his research focused on mechanism-design contracting models in various supply chain coordination problem settings. His other research includes dynamic-programming heuristics for vehicle routing problems, ambulance logistics related to optimal base locations, and approximation algorithms for the maximum coverage problem. He has assisted in teaching the courses Combinatorial Optimisation and Simulation, and supervised several bachelor theses in the Econometrics and Operations Research programme.
Thesis Abstract
In a supply chain consisting of individualistic parties, the sharing of information is not always beneficial to each party. If a party discloses his private information it could undermine his bargaining position in the supply chain. Consequently, there is no incentive to share information, which results in information asymmetry between the involved parties. We consider a two-echelon supply chain setting viewed from the upstream party's perspective, who faces an individualistic downstream party with private information. The upstream party uses mechanism-design techniques to maximise his own benefit by designing a menu of contracts, which is offered to the downstream party. Each contract specifies the procurement plan for the supply chain and a side payment. These side payments are the incentive mechanism to persuade the downstream party to accept a contract from the menu.
We consider this principal-agent contracting problem for several utility maximisation or cost minimisation problem settings. The goal is to determine a menu of contracts that is the most beneficial to the upstream party, whilst still being acceptable for the downstream party. To achieve this goal, we analyse a variety of optimisation models, which differ in the requirements of the menu of contracts. Our analysis provides insights into modelling approaches, structural properties of optimal menus, and solution methods.
Time and location
The PhD defence will take place in the Senate Hall of Eramus University Rotterdam and will start at 9.30hrs.
- More information
For more information about this ceremony, please contact Ronald de Groot, Communication Officer of Erasmus School of Economics phone +31 10 408 1762 or by email: rdegroot@ese.eur.nl.