Although relative performance feedback generally appears to be effective in improving performance in healthcare, there is limited understanding of how the design of rankings and individual abilities affect physician effort.
- Speaker
- Date
- Monday 3 Jun 2024, 12:00 - 13:00
- Type
- Seminar
- Room
- J7-55
- Building
- Bayle Building
Using a controlled lab-in-the-field experiment with practicing and future physicians (N=352), we systematically analyse effort choices under different ranking as a peer-feedback mechanism to improve performance in small teams.
Ranking designs are exogenously varied by the number and position of thresholds in the outcome distribution. We observe that an additional threshold, which increases the number of ranks, leads to a higher effort only among individuals capable of exceeding that threshold. For the others, effort remains unaffected or even may even decrease. A ranking with thresholds spanning the entire outcome distribution maximises overall physician effort.
Individuals are affected in heterogeneous ways. Setting a threshold at the upper end of the outcome distribution significantly motivates individuals capable of achieving the highest rank. Thresholds in the middle and lower ranges prevent demotivating effects on those who cannot reach the highest rank.
Our behavioural results suggest that in order to effectively motivate teams of physicians with peer feedback, clinical leaders should set thresholds such that all physicians can improve their rank through increased effort, while also preserving exclusivity for both the top and the bottom rank.
Online attendance
This is an in-person seminar, but a Zoom link is available upon request (healtheconomics@ese.eur.nl).
- Related links
- Health Economics
