Contrary to the traditional economic view that individuals misreport private information to maximize material payoffs, recent evidence highlights robust preferences for truth-telling among many decision-makers. Theoretical models that align with aggregate behavioral patterns posit that these preferences arise from both an intrinsic motivation to be honest and a desire to be perceived as honest.
- Speaker
- Date
- Friday 1 Nov 2024, 12:00 - 13:15
- Type
- Seminar
- Room
- T3-03
- Building
- Mandeville Building
Joint work with Susanna Grundmann and Simeon Schudy
We propose a novel incentivized measure to independently capture these two motives at the individual level. We validate the measures’ properties experimentally and show that it predicts behavior in other commonly studied situations that allow for (dis)honesty. The measure enables the classification of individual preference types, revealing systematic heterogeneity and fairly stable type distributions across different samples. Additionally, we propose a 2-minute survey module that proxies both motives and predicts behavior in a typical reporting task. Including this module in a large panel, we offer first insights into how early-life experiences may shape preferences for being and being seen as honest.
About the speaker
Lisa is an Assistant Professor at the School of Business and Economics at RWTH Aachen University and the Director of AIXperiment, the School’s experimental laboratory. She is also a tenured lecturer at the Economics Department at the University of Essex. She holds a PhD from LMU Munich. She is an applied microeconomist, working at the intersection of behavioral and development economics. Her work has been published in Journal of Development Economics, PNAS, European Economic Review, World Development, and Management Science.
Registration
If you would like to have a bilateral or join the speaker for lunch or dinner on Friday, please send an email to Sacha (kapoor@ese.eur.nl).
See also
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